On 12 February 2013 08:49, Bob Ippolito <bob@redivi.com> wrote:

The Python and Ruby communities are actively working on improving the security of their packaging infrastructure. I haven't paid close attention to any of the efforts so far, but anyone working on cabal/hackage security should probably take a peek. I lurk on Python's catalog-sig list and here's the interesting bits I've noticed from the past few weeks:

[Catalog-sig] [Draft] Package signing and verification process
http://mail.python.org/pipermail/catalog-sig/2013-February/004832.html

[Catalog-sig] [DRAFT] Proposal for fixing PyPI/pip security
http://mail.python.org/pipermail/catalog-sig/2013-February/004994.html

Python PyPi Security Working Document:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e3g1v8INHjHsUJ-Q0odQOO8s91KMAbqLQyqj20CSZYA/edit

Rubygems Threat Model:
http://mail.python.org/pipermail/catalog-sig/2013-February/005099.html

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fobWhPRqB4_JftFWh6iTWClUo_SPBnxqbBTdAvbb_SA/edit

TUF: The Update Framework
https://www.updateframework.com/

On Fri, Feb 1, 2013 at 4:07 AM, Christopher Done <chrisdone@gmail.com> wrote:
Hey dude, it looks like we made the same project yesterday:

http://www.reddit.com/r/haskell/comments/17njda/proposal_a_trivial_cabal_package_signing_utility/

Yours is nice as it doesn't depend on GPG. Although that could be a
nice thing because GPG manages keys. Dunno.

Another diff is that mine puts the .sig inside the .tar.gz, yours puts
it separate.

=)

On 31 January 2013 09:11, Vincent Hanquez <tab@snarc.org> wrote:
> On 01/30/2013 07:27 PM, Edward Z. Yang wrote:
>>
>> https://status.heroku.com/incidents/489
>>
>> Unsigned Hackage packages are a ticking time bomb.
>>
> I agree this is terrible, I've started working on this, but this is quite a
> bit of work and other priorities always pop up.
>
> https://github.com/vincenthz/cabal
> https://github.com/vincenthz/cabal-signature
>
> My current implementation generate a manifest during sdist'ing in cabal, and
> have cabal-signature called by cabal on the manifest to create a
> manifest.sign.
>
> The main issue i'm facing is how to create a Web of Trust for doing all the
> public verification bits.
>
> --
> Vincent
>
>
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> Haskell-Cafe mailing list
> Haskell-Cafe@haskell.org
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