On 2015-04-28 at 15:50:26 +0200, Michael Snoyman wrote: [...]
PS: We shouldn't forget that there's also an existing deployed cabal-install user-base we can't get rid off so easily, which may still leak unencrypted basic-auth credentials for the years to come. Just saying...
I agree on that front. I think that Hackage should turn away all uploads that aren't TLS-secured, and should make that change ASAP.
Well, even if you do that, you can only reject the upload-request *after* the http client has already leaked the basic-auth credentials over a non-secured http channel... :-/ So the only thing this measure would buy us IMHO is that CLI users would get an incentive to upgrade their cabal-install tooling (if they use e.g. `cabal upload`), but it wouldn't protect against accidentally falling back to an older cabal-install version picked up by accident (and then again compromising the credentials). I.e. this measure on its own wouldn't remove the unsecured basic-auth eavesdropping attack-window completely, only make it smaller. Cheers, hvr