Hi folks, As I mentioned previously on the commercialhaskell list, we're working on Hackage security for the IHG at the moment. We've finally written up the design for that as a blog post: http://www.well-typed.com/blog/2015/04/improving-hackage-security It includes a section at the end comparing in general terms to this proposal (specifically Chris's part on package signing). The design is basically "The Update Framework" for Hackage. Our current implementation effort for the IHG covers the first part of that design. http://theupdateframework.com/ I think TUF addresses many of the concerns that have been raised in this thread, e.g. about threat models, what signatures actually mean etc. It also covers the question of making the "who's allowed to upload what" information transparent, with proper cryptographic evidence (albeit that's in the second part of the design). So if collectively we can also implement the second part of TUF for Hackage then I think we can address these issues properly. Other things worth noting: * This will finally allow us to have untrusted public mirrors, which is the traditional approach to improving repository reliability. * We're incorporating an existing design for incremental updates of the package index to significantly improve "cabal update" times. I'll chip in elsewhere in this thread with more details about how TUF (or our adaptation of it for hackage) solves some of the problems raised here. Duncan On Mon, 2015-04-13 at 10:02 +0000, Michael Snoyman wrote:
Many of you saw the blog post Mathieu wrote[1] about having more composable community infrastructure, which in particular focused on improvements to Hackage. I've been discussing some of these ideas with both Mathieu and others in the community working on some similar thoughts. I've also separately spent some time speaking with Chris about package signing[2]. Through those discussions, it's become apparent to me that there are in fact two core pieces of functionality we're relying on Hackage for today:
* A centralized location for accessing package metadata (i.e., the cabal files) and the package contents themselves (i.e., the sdist tarballs) * A central authority for deciding who is allowed to make releases of packages, and make revisions to cabal files
In my opinion, fixing the first problem is in fact very straightforward to do today using existing tools. FP Complete already hosts a full Hackage mirror[3] backed by S3, for instance, and having the metadata mirrored to a Git repository as well is not a difficult technical challenge. This is the core of what Mathieu was proposing as far as composable infrastructure, corresponding to next actions 1 and 3 at the end of his blog post (step 2, modifying Hackage, is not a prerequesite). In my opinion, such a system would far surpass in usability, reliability, and extensibility our current infrastructure, and could be rolled out in a few days at most.
However, that second point- the central authority- is the more interesting one. As it stands, our entire package ecosystem is placing a huge level of trust in Hackage, without any serious way to vet what's going on there. Attack vectors abound, e.g.:
* Man in the middle attacks: as we are all painfully aware, cabal-install does not support HTTPS, so a MITM attack on downloads from Hackage is trivial * A breach of the Hackage Server codebase would allow anyone to upload nefarious code[4] * Any kind of system level vulnerability could allow an attacker to compromise the server in the same way
Chris's package signing work addresses most of these vulnerabilities, by adding a layer of cryptographic signatures on top of Hackage as the central authority. I'd like to propose taking this a step further: removing Hackage as the central authority, and instead relying entirely on cryptographic signatures to release new packages.
I wrote up a strawman proposal last week[5] which clearly needs work to be a realistic option. My question is: are people interested in moving forward on this? If there's no interest, and everyone is satisfied with continuing with the current Hackage-central-authority, then we can proceed with having reliable and secure services built around Hackage. But if others- like me- would like to see a more secure system built from the ground up, please say so and let's continue that conversation.
[1] https://www.fpcomplete.com/blog/2015/03/composable-community-infrastructure
[2] https://github.com/commercialhaskell/commercialhaskell/wiki/Package-signing-...
[3] https://www.fpcomplete.com/blog/2015/03/hackage-mirror [4] I don't think this is just a theoretical possibility for some point in the future. I have reported an easily trigerrable DoS attack on the current Hackage Server codebase, which has been unresolved for 1.5 months now [5] https://gist.github.com/snoyberg/732aa47a5dd3864051b9
-- Duncan Coutts, Haskell Consultant Well-Typed LLP, http://www.well-typed.com/