
One could argue that the potential for a false sense of security could make (very) bad encryption worse than no encryption. Personally, I've always been a bit uncomfortable with the small number of widely-used implementations (AFAIK OpenSSL and GnuTLS combined account for pretty much all TLS-using open-source software), and I think pushing another one into wider usage would be a good thing (while acknowledging that it's likely more vulnerable than the older implementations). On Sun, 3 Nov 2013, John Wiegley wrote:
Johan Tibell
writes: True. Although to be honest I want something true and tested when it comes to crypto.
Although in this case, the worst scenario is that we return to parity with the status quo (i.e., the security lib is worthless and we revert back to having no security).
-- John Wiegley FP Complete Haskell tools, training and consulting http://fpcomplete.com johnw on #haskell/irc.freenode.net _______________________________________________ Haskell-Cafe mailing list Haskell-Cafe@haskell.org http://www.haskell.org/mailman/listinfo/haskell-cafe
-- Scott Lawrence