Re: [Haskell-cafe] How to create an online poll

See also www.surveymonkey.com
Bulat Ziganshin
Hello haskell-cafe,
-- Best regards, Bulat mailto:Bulat.Ziganshin@gmail.com
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There's also the Condorcet Internet Voting Service: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html gregg reynolds wrote:
See also www.surveymonkey.com
Bulat Ziganshin
wrote: Hello haskell-cafe,

On Wed, Feb 18, 2009 at 10:40 PM, Anton van Straaten
There's also the Condorcet Internet Voting Service:
This looks like exactly what we need! Any objections? --Max

I'm sure Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) can provide us with
an online voting solution.
Their value-add services allows us to set the outcome beforehand, so, in
effect, the the voting process will be determinate. Which is certainly of
interest to Haskell coders.
On Wed, Feb 18, 2009 at 4:05 PM, Max Rabkin
On Wed, Feb 18, 2009 at 10:40 PM, Anton van Straaten
wrote: There's also the Condorcet Internet Voting Service:
This looks like exactly what we need! Any objections?
--Max _______________________________________________ Haskell-Cafe mailing list Haskell-Cafe@haskell.org http://www.haskell.org/mailman/listinfo/haskell-cafe
-- We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them. - A. Einstein

Rick R
I'm sure Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) can provide us with an online voting solution.
You know, while the recent voting scandals have been milked for all they're worth by the open source community, FP has been very quiet about it. Isn't this an application where correctness matters? How about a proof that the software never loses (or injects) votes, for instance? -k -- If I haven't seen further, it is by standing in the footprints of giants

Ketil Malde wrote:
Rick R writes:
I'm sure Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) can provide us with an online voting solution.
You know, while the recent voting scandals have been milked for all they're worth by the open source community, FP has been very quiet about it.
I think that's because FP is guilty of inventing the circular time traveling knots^1 used to correctly predict future election results in the first place. ^1 See also Russel O'Connor's article in http://www.haskell.org/sitewiki/images/1/14/TMR-Issue6.pdf Regards, apfelmus -- http://apfelmus.nfshost.com

I think the capabilities community including E and Coyotos/BitC have
extensively addressed this topic. Coyotos is taking the correct approach for
trusted voting platform. Since, even if your software is trustworthy, it
can't be trusted if the OS on which it runs is suspect. However, we might
have a few more rigged elections before we see any deliverables from
Coyotos.
On Thu, Feb 19, 2009 at 2:45 AM, Ketil Malde
Rick R
writes: I'm sure Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) can provide us with an online voting solution.
You know, while the recent voting scandals have been milked for all they're worth by the open source community, FP has been very quiet about it. Isn't this an application where correctness matters? How about a proof that the software never loses (or injects) votes, for instance?
-k -- If I haven't seen further, it is by standing in the footprints of giants
-- We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them. - A. Einstein

2009/2/19 Rick R
I think the capabilities community including E and Coyotos/BitC have extensively addressed this topic. Coyotos is taking the correct approach for trusted voting platform. Since, even if your software is trustworthy, it can't be trusted if the OS on which it runs is suspect.
Woah, that's a pretty interesting question! How do you write software which is protected against a malicious operating system (mind -- not erroneous, but rather somebody detecting the software you're running and changing your vote). Maybe some sort of randomized cryptographic technique, in which, with high probability, the OS either runs your program correctly or causes it to crash. Luke
However, we might have a few more rigged elections before we see any deliverables from Coyotos.
On Thu, Feb 19, 2009 at 2:45 AM, Ketil Malde
wrote: Rick R
writes: I'm sure Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) can provide us with an online voting solution.
You know, while the recent voting scandals have been milked for all they're worth by the open source community, FP has been very quiet about it. Isn't this an application where correctness matters? How about a proof that the software never loses (or injects) votes, for instance?
-k -- If I haven't seen further, it is by standing in the footprints of giants
-- We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them. - A. Einstein
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2009/2/19 Luke Palmer
2009/2/19 Rick R
I think the capabilities community including E and Coyotos/BitC have extensively addressed this topic. Coyotos is taking the correct approach for trusted voting platform. Since, even if your software is trustworthy, it can't be trusted if the OS on which it runs is suspect.
Woah, that's a pretty interesting question! How do you write software which is protected against a malicious operating system (mind -- not erroneous, but rather somebody detecting the software you're running and changing your vote). Maybe some sort of randomized cryptographic technique, in which, with high probability, the OS either runs your program correctly or causes it to crash. Luke
Free associating: "Static Typing for a Faulty Lambda Calculus" http://lambda-the-ultimate.org/node/2108 "A transient hardware fault occurs when an energetic particle strikes a transistor, causing it to change state. These faults do not cause permanent damage, but may result in incorrect program execution by altering signal transfers or stored values....This paper defines the first formal, type-theoretic framework for studying reliable computation in the presence of transient faults. More specifically, it defines lambda-zap, a lambda calculus that exhibits intermittent data faults. In order to detect and recover from these faults, lambda-zap programs replicate intermediate computations and use majority voting, thereby modeling software-based fault tolerance techniques studied extensively, but informally. To ensure that programs maintain the proper invariants and use lambda-zap primitives correctly, the paper defines a type system for the language. This type system guarantees that well-typed programs can tolerate any single data fault. To demonstrate that lambda-zap can serve as an idealized typed intermediate language, we define a type-preserving translation from a standard simply-typed lambda calculus into lambda-zap." -- gwern

2009/2/19 Rick R
I think the capabilities community including E and Coyotos/BitC have extensively addressed this topic. Coyotos is taking the correct approach for trusted voting platform. Since, even if your software is trustworthy, it can't be trusted if the OS on which it runs is suspect.
Woah, that's a pretty interesting question! How do you write software which is protected against a malicious operating system (mind -- not erroneous, but rather somebody detecting the software you're running and changing your vote). Maybe some sort of randomized cryptographic technique, in which, with high probability, the OS either runs your program correctly or causes it to crash.
It gets worse. Even if you write your OS in Haskell, how do you know your compiler hasn't been compromised? Or the hardware? The solution necessarily involves a social component, e.g. Haskell, with the development
2009/2/19 Luke Palmer

This looks very promising! Investigating... anton:
There's also the Condorcet Internet Voting Service:
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html
gregg reynolds wrote:
See also www.surveymonkey.com
Bulat Ziganshin
wrote: Hello haskell-cafe,
_______________________________________________ Haskell-Cafe mailing list Haskell-Cafe@haskell.org http://www.haskell.org/mailman/listinfo/haskell-cafe
participants (10)
-
Anton van Straaten
-
Don Stewart
-
gregg reynolds
-
Gregg Reynolds
-
Gwern Branwen
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Heinrich Apfelmus
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Ketil Malde
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Luke Palmer
-
Max Rabkin
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Rick R