Re: [Haskell-cafe] ANNOUNCE: tls, native TLS/SSL protocolimplementation

While I can see your point about potentially introducing new security holes, and producing much less trusted code, I feel having tidy, pure libraries that we can all integrate into our Haskell is a benefit that far outweighs this. Especially when we have nice things like the type system, which can be used to alleviate many of the security worries. I agree in general, for code like servers and file formats, but I worry in particular about cryptographic primitives. Some side channel attacks seem to call for a very low-level language, to make it easier to verify that e.g. execution time and the memory access pattern does not depend on the key.

On Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 09:41, Brandon Moore
While I can see your point about potentially introducing new security holes, and producing much less trusted code, I feel having tidy, pure libraries that we can all integrate into our Haskell is a benefit that far outweighs this. Especially when we have nice things like the type system, which can be used to alleviate many of the security worries.
I agree in general, for code like servers and file formats, but I worry in particular about cryptographic primitives. Some side channel attacks seem to call for a very low-level language, to make it easier to verify that e.g. execution time and the memory access pattern does not depend on the key.
I personally think we have to draw the line somewhere regarding what we care about when it comes to security. (Provable) correctness, maintainability through well-structured code are things we are more likely to gain through using high-level languages like Haskell. That is actually a lot of security bundled up in those things. What we lose is low-level control, which would be required to thwart side-channel attacks. On the other hand, I'm not convinced openssl or gnutls deal with side-channel attacks very effectively either. In any case, there is nothing that says we must have only *one* SSL library, based on this discussion there seems to be people in the community who still would prefer a binding to openssl/gnutls. /M -- Magnus Therning (OpenPGP: 0xAB4DFBA4) magnus@therning.org Jabber: magnus@therning.org http://therning.org/magnus identi.ca|twitter: magthe

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/11/10 04:41 , Brandon Moore wrote:
particular about cryptographic primitives. Some side channel attacks seem to call for a very low-level language, to make it easier to verify that e.g. execution time and the memory access pattern does not depend on the key.
It's hard enough to predict execution times for Haskell code at the best of times :) - -- brandon s. allbery [linux,solaris,freebsd,perl] allbery@kf8nh.com system administrator [openafs,heimdal,too many hats] allbery@ece.cmu.edu electrical and computer engineering, carnegie mellon university KF8NH -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.10 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAky0V4cACgkQIn7hlCsL25V0VwCg1GrZkqrGU0CswG/KSQvHO+hJ B2QAn269l6o58G0AeRlyWV9lRTaFF6K6 =6RTp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (3)
-
Brandon Moore
-
Brandon S Allbery KF8NH
-
Magnus Therning