For anyone still interested, I've implemented something very much like what Gideon et al suggested to SPJ. It's in (but not exported from) DRBG's Crypto.Random.DRBG module [1]: split :: CryptoRandomGen g => g -> Either GenError (g,g) split g = do (ent,g') <- genBytes (genSeedLength `for` g) g new <- newGen ent return (g', new) Their words were:
The generator G is a pair comprising a crypto key G.k and an integer counter (the “message”) G.c.
That is embodied in the CryptoRandomGen, typically in the manner recommended by NIST SP 800-90 though more instances are possible.
The (next G) operation returns a pair: 1. a random integer r obtained by encrypting G.c with G.k, and 2. a new generator G’ such that G’.k = G.k and G’.c = G.c + 1.
Specifically, this is the CTR DRBG. Someone noted "other cryptographic options exist" which I take to mean the hash or HMAC based generators could be acceptable.
The (split G) operation is similar, returning the same G’, except that instead of returning a random integer r it returns a third generator G’’ such that G’’.k = r and G’’.c = 0.
The exact starting value of the counter is arbitrary (NIST uses 1, I think), but the use of the output of one generator to seed the new generator is what's important. This is exactly what the above 'split' does. Some questions: 1) Do we want to go down this path and replace StdGen with something that has stronger theoretical backing for splits? Or perhaps we should just let things be and users looking for something stronger can use a hackage package? 2) What level of performance are we be looking for? 3) What deps do we consider acceptable for a replacement? 'random' has very few deps, DRBG has too many (for a core library). The proposed solution necessitates a crypto algorithm which is either slow (Crypto) or requries bytestring and maybe FFI+C (SHA, SHA2, cryptohash, AES). Also, Ian asked if we could split a non-cryptographic generator using a cryptographic one. I don't see why not (pretend the tuple is a fitting data structure): split2 :: RandomGen g, CrytpoRandomGen c => (g,c) -> ((g,c), (g,c)) split2 (g1,c1) = do (c2,c3) <- split c1 (int,c4) <- crandom c2 let g2 = newStdGen int return ( (g1, c3), (g2, c4) ) Cheers, Thomas [1] http://hackage.haskell.org/packages/archive/DRBG/0.1.1/doc/html/src/Crypto-R...
A suitable block cipher system might be 128-bit AES (Rijndael). Unencumbered implementations exist in a variety of languages, and performance is pretty good and will improve dramatically as hardware support improves. I’d pick both crypto key size and the size of the result r to be 128 bits, and employ a 64 bit counter c. Other crypto options exist.
From: Simon Peyton-Jones Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2010 3:11 AM To: Burton Smith; Gideon Yuval (Gideon Yuval) Cc: Tolga Acar; Simon Peyton-Jones Subject: RE: Random number generation
Burton, Gideon, Tolga
Aha, that’s interesting. I’d never seen a random number generator based on crypto, but it seems like an attractive idea. As I understand it, successive calls to ‘next’ will give you
encrypt(0), encrypt(1), encrypt(2), encrypt(3),....
Is this standard? Does it have provably good randomness properties, (cycle length, what else?) like other RNGs? Or does it simply seem very plausible?
Can I send it round to the Haskell mailing list, in the hope that someone will turn the idea into a library? (Ideally I’d like to make claims about the randomness properties in doing so, hence my qns above.)
From: Gideon Yuval (Gideon Yuval) Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2010 7:15 AM To: Simon Peyton-Jones; Burton Smith Cc: Tolga Acar Subject: RE: Random number generation
As long as the key, and the non-counting part of the counter, are kept” secret”, anyone who can distinguish these pseudorandoms from real random, in less than 2^128 steps, has a nice paper for crypto-2011 (this is known as “provable security”) concerning a weakness in AES128.
One exception: real randoms have a birthday paradox; the pseudorandoms suggested do not. If you care, you can:
(1) Limit the counter to 2^32 steps (paradox has 2^-64 probability) or even 2^16 (2^-96), then rekey; or
(2) XOR 2 such encrypted counters, with different keys; or
(3) XOR 3 successive values for the same counter (just possibly cheaper; top-of-head idea).
More hard-core: swap the position of key & message: encrypting a constant “secret” with 1,2,3,4…. Gives pseudorandoms with no birthday paradox.
From: Tolga Acar Sent: 03 November 2010 15:50 To: Gideon Yuval (Gideon Yuval); Simon Peyton-Jones; Burton Smith Subject: RE: Random number generation
Simon,
The general idea is not really that new in the crypto area with constraints Gideon describes, of course. That is typically called a PRNG – Pseudo Random Number Generator, or in another parlance, Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBG). The DRBG constructions based on hash functions and block ciphers are even standardized in NIST publication SP800-90 (even though I may not recommend every one of them).
As for the construction below, that is based on the AES block cipher, that essentially takes advantage of the PRP (Pseudo Random Permutation) property of the AES block cipher, as each block cipher ought to be. So, as Gideon outlines below, if you fix the key, the PRP gives you a random-looking (or, in other terms, indistinguishable from random) output that no one without the secret key and the “state” can generate or easily predict. Assuming an ideal cipher (and AES is a close approximation to it), the probability is believed to be the birthday paradox - no counterexample or a proof exists without assumptions; so we stick to the birthday bound.
There ought to be papers on this somewhere. If not, that condensed information is spread across many papers and is part of the crypto folklore, I’d say.
From: Burton Smith Sent: 03 November 2010 19:03 To: Simon Peyton-Jones Cc: Gideon Yuval (Gideon Yuval); Tolga Acar Subject: RE: Random number generation
Just two points of further clarification:
1. All PRNGs used in the technical computing space fail the birthday paradox criterion (i.e. have full period), so we really need not worry about this. Also, there are other mitigating factors, e.g. suppose we are using the PRNG to generate pseudorandom residues mod n << 2^128; the paradox is happily present there.
2. The big innovation in this scheme is that the rekeying operation done by split creates a new generator with independence guaranteed by “provable security” in the sense Gideon mentioned – if someone can find something nonrandom in the correlation between G’ and G’’, say, then it amounts to a weakness in AES128 and is publishable. So it’s yet another example of reducibility, common in our field: “if you can easily transform a known/famous hard problem P into this other problem Q, Q must be hard”.
_______________________________________________ Libraries mailing list Libraries@haskell.org http://www.haskell.org/mailman/listinfo/libraries